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ABSTRACT

This article attempts to track China's intellectual property rights ("IPR")
enforcement problem through exploring its fundamental institutional defects that
fuels impunity of, or at least fails instilling an ethos hostile to, IPR infringements. By
examining China's philosophical and institutional predisposition, this article argues
that counterfeiting and piracy are not problems caused by the Confucian ethics, as
the conventional wisdom underscores, but rather, among other things, a unique
political phenomenon resulting from the systemic dystrophy fundamental to the
institutional development. This article concludes that, to a large extent, the IPR
enforcement problems in China are attributed to its unique bureaucracy
characterized by the collectivist ideology, decentralized responsibilities, the lack of
transparencies and the inadequate judiciary.

Copyright © 2008 The John Marshall Law School

Cite as Wei Shi, The Paradoxof Confucian Determinism: Tracking the
Root Causes of IntellectualPropertyRights Problem in China, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 454 (2008).

THE PARADOX OF CONFUCIAN DETERMINISM: TRACKING THE ROOT
CAUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROBLEM IN CHINA
WEI SHI*

INTRODUCTION

The Office of the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") depicts China as
one of the main offenders of intellectual property rights ("IPR).1 While China has
established a full institution of IPR legislation, 2 its enforcement procedures are
contrastingly fragile. There has been plenteous theoretical literature examining the
impact of the standards of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPs") on Chinese legislation, while also addressing Chinese IPR
enforcement problems. 3 One potentially interesting testing ground that this
literature does not empirically explore in much depth is how to identify the
dominating aspect and focus accurately on the targeted problem. Moreover, one
conventional, yet misleading, hypothesis links China's enforcement problem to
Confucian ethics. 4 This hypothesis follows a mainstream point of view that
Confucian values provide a pervasive and unconscious influence on their
comprehension of, and commitment to, intellectual property laws. 5 This argument is
illustrated by the phrase "to steal a book is an elegant offence" 6 (qie shu bu suan tou)
indicating traditional Chinese culture has no concept that copying is an "offense"
*Wei Shi, Lecturer in Law, University of Wales, Bangor, the United Kingdom; Fellow of
Cambridge Overseas Society. LL.M., Renmin University of China, PhD, St. John's College,
University of Cambridge. The author would like to thank Nick Sinclair-Brown, Robert Weatherley,
and Nick Foster for their insightful comments on the early versions of this article.
Available at www.jmripl.com.
1 US.: China Has Hirh Rate of Intellectual Property Infringement, Apr. 29, 2005,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2005/April/20050429155355mbzemogO.5231745.html
(last visited Apr. 3, 2007).
2 Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 11 BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO SCH. OF LAW OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELL. PROP. 6 (2002).
3 Id.
at 26-27, 31. See also JIANQIANG NIE, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN CHINA 157-58, 161, 163 (2006) (describing China's enforcement efforts in response to
TRIPS requirements and questioning whether China should implement these efforts through its
courts).
4 WILLIAM ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 19-23 (1995).
5 Id. at 19-20 (discussing that the Confucian culture militated against copyright protection and
did not allow intellectual property protection to take root); see also Yu, supra note 2, at 44
(contending that "the culprit behind the Chinese piracy problem is the Confucian beliefs ingrained
in the Chinese culture," which contradicts intellectual property rights and is the real problem
behind China's inadequate protection of intellectual property rights); Alexander C. Chen, Climbing

the Great Wall. A Guide to IntellectualProperty Enforcement in the People's Republic of China, 25
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10 (1997) (mentioning that "Confucianism ...provided [a] strong barrier[] to the idea
of 'intellectual property'.....); Andrew Evans, Note, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO,

TRIPS and Chinese Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 587,
588-90 (2003) (suggesting that Confucian ethics has been a philosophical obstacle to combating
Chinese counterfeiting and piracy).
(3See ALFORD, supra note 4, at 19-23,
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and, as a result, advantages from imitation on other's IPR are regarded as legitimate
within Confucian culture.
This article attempts to track China's enforcement problem through exploring
China's fundamental institutional defects that may fuel impunity of, or at least not
instill an ethos hostile to, IPR infringements. By examining China's philosophical
and institutional predisposition, this article concludes that counterfeiting and piracy
are not problems caused by Confucian ethics, as conventional wisdom underscores,
but rather, among other things, a unique political phenomenon resulting from the
systemic dystrophy fundamental to the institutional development.

I. CONFUCIUS'S CONFUSION: IS STEALING A BOOK AN ELEGANT OFFENSE?

Confucius can be viewed as a popular international symbol of China, but
Confucianism has also been acknowledged as the foundational philosophy of oriental
civilization discerned in China, Japan and Korea. 7 Unlike Western values which
advocate individual rights, Confucian ethics emphasizes the virtue of austerity, hard
work, teamwork and submission to authority, all of which have contributed to the
economic development in the Eastern nations.8 In the "Confucianized region," the
Confucian heritage has been cherished, nurtured and preserved over the centuries.9
In Japan and Korea, in particular, Confucian norms of moral precepts have
permeated the intellectual life at large and have played a pivotal role in molding
domestic culture as it exists today.10
In Japan, for instance, the cultural evolution has illustrated a continuing
vitality of Confucianism. In Japan, Confucianism tended to be overshadowed by
Buddhism in early nineteenth century but soon regained its dominant ethical
position.11 In the 1950s and 1960s, Confucianism was perceived as "an obstacle to
modernization," but it reconfirmed its status as a "facilitator" in the 1980s. 12 In
modern Japan, although not adopted and practiced as a religion, Confucianism has
deeply influenced Japanese culture and custom, 13 and these unique ethical values
continue to permeate modern Japanese society and affect Japanese thinking. 14 As
noted by professors Edwin Reischauer 15 and Marius Jansen, 16 "[almost no one
7 HYUNG KIM, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS OF CHINA AND THE WEST: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 15 (1981).
8 THE JAPANESE TRAJECTORY: MODERNIZATION AND BEYOND 5 (Gavan McCormack & Yoshio
Sugimoto eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
Evans, supra note 5, at 589.
10 JAPAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 104 (Ronald E. Dolan & Robert L. Worden eds., 1992) (expressing
Japan's intricate involvement with Confucianism); see also MARY E. CONNOR, THE KOREAS: A
GLOBAL STUDIES HANDBOOK 180 (ABC-CLIO 2002) (expressing the impact of Confucianism on
Koreans).
11EDWIN 0. REISCHAUER & MARIUS B. JANSEN, JAPANESE TODAY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY
203-04 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
12 See THE JAPANESE TRAJECTORY, supranote 8, at 5.
13 JAPAN: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 10, at 103-04.
14 REISCHAUER & JANSEN, supra note 11, at 204.
15See goenerallyEmerson Chapin, Edwin Reisehauer,Diplomat and Seholar, Dies at 79, N.Y.

TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990, § 1, at 40. Edwin Reischauer was a leading U.S. educator and noted scholar of
the history and culture of Japan, and of East Asia. Id. Most of his teaching career was spent at

[7:454 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

considers himself a Confucianist today, but in a sense almost all Japanese are."1 7
According to Reischauer and Jansen, while Japan has widely adopted democratic
doctrines and embraced liberal values, strong Confucian traits still run deep in
Japanese consciousness, and "Confucianism probably exerts more influence on
Japanese than does any other of traditional religions or philosophies."18 As renowned
Japanese economist and professor Michio Morishima 19 has noted, the European view
20
underscores the individual, rather than the organization to which he or she belongs,
but the "Japanese rule emphasizes the importance of the organization, cooperation
and teamwork, rather than the individual." 21 Each view delineates a distinct logic
shaped by the culture in which it is embedded. The infrastructure of Confucian
philosophy, based on the cardinal relationship and hierarchical order, has played a
significant role in Japanese economic development 22 and contributed substantially to
23
its "economic miracle" subsequent to the Second World War.
Like Japan, Korea is another typical Confucian country, and the traditional
Confucian social structure is still prevalent in modern Korean society. 24 As Mary

Connor, 25 has pointed out, "nothing has shaped Korean society as much as Confucian
philosophy." 26 According to Connor, children in Korea are taught before the age of ten
that their lives do not belong to themselves but to their families. 27 As professor Dr.
Donald Clark 28 observes, it is unusual and unacceptable for a young Korean to make
Harvard University, where he became the director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. Id. Professor
Reischauer also served as U.S. ambassador to Japan in the 1960s. Id
16See generally Wolfgang Saxon, Marjus B. Jansen, 78, Scholar of Japanese History and
Culture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at C6. Marius Berthus Jansen was a world-renown scholar and
Emeritus Professor of Japanese History at Princeton University. -d.
17REISCHAUER & JANSEN, supra note 11, at 204.
18 Id.

19See goene-ally Michio Morishima, TIMES (London), Aug. 4, 2004, at 27. Michio Morishima
was a Japanese economist and emeritus professor of London School of Economics ('LSE"), Sir John
Hicks Professor of LSE. Id. He was also emeritus professor of Osaka University and a member of
the British Academy. Id.
20 See MICHIO MORISHIMA, WHY HAS JAPAN 'SUCCEEDED'? WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE
JAPANESE ETHOS (1982) (illustrating the weak reception of liberalism and individualism as an
important factor of Japan's economic achievements).
21 David Vaver, The Future of IntellectualPropertyLaw."Japaneseand European Perspectives
Compared 5 (Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre, Working Paper No. 09/99, 1999),
available at http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWPO999.pdf.
22CAROL GLUCK, JAPAN'S MODERN MYTHS, IDEOLOGY IN THE LATE MEIJI PERIOD 258-59, 286
(1985).
23 MORISHIMA, supra note 20, at 19.
24 See Kyu Ho Youm, Libel Laws and Freedom of the Press: South Korea and Japan
Reexamined, 8 B.U. INT'L L.J. 53, 78 (1990) (using libel laws to demonstrate that Confucian ethics in
Korea is still prevailing).
25 See generallyThe National Peace Corps Association: Mary E. Connor, http://www.rpcv.org/
pages/sitepage.cfm?id=776 (last visited May 11, 2008). Mary Connor teaches AP U.S. History and
Asian Studies at Westridge School, Pasadena, California. Id. In 2000 she received the Korea
Society's Fellowship in Korean Studies Program to study and travel in Korea. TKS Events in
Review, KOREA SOC'Y Q., Fall 2000, at 23-24, available at http://www.koreasociety.org/
download document/87_volume 1 number_3.html.
26 MARY E. CONNOR, THE KOREAS: A GLOBAL STUDIES HANDBOOK 180 (ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2002).
27

Id

Soe generally Donald N. Clark, http://www.trinity.edu/departments/int-studies/faculty/
dclark.htm (last visited May 11, 2008). Dr. Donald Clark teaches courses on China, Japan, Korea,
28
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a seemingly important decision without taking into account the opinions of his
parents. 29 In Korea, Confucianism was accepted so eagerly and in so strict a form
that the Chinese themselves regarded the Korean adherents as more virtuous than
themselves. 30 As noted by professor Choong Soon Kim, 31 Koreans value harmony,
social stability, a respect for cultivation, and motivational force, and tend to be
obedient in hierarchical orders, which appears to be compatible with dynamic
entrepreneurship in Korea. 32 As a developing nation, Korea has received a positive
commentary based on its accomplishment to retain traditional values while
33
establishing its domestic industries.
Apparently, the hypothesis linking IPR violation to Confucian ethics fails to
account for the current lower rates of counterfeiting and piracy in Japan and Korea
which are equally, if not more, influenced by Confucian values than China. The
significant difference is that both Japan and Korea have established stronger IPR
regimes because of varying stages of economic development. 3 4 By accumulating
sufficient indigenous capabilities with extensive science and technology
infrastructures, these countries reached the later stage of technological development
where IPR protection became an important element in domestic industrial
35
activities.
While China shares the Confucian tradition with Japan and Korea, China's
unique socialist ideology, administrative decentralization, inadequate judiciary and
huge but inefficient bureaucracy have made intellectual property enforcement

and the history of American foreign relations at Trinity University, where he severs as Director of
the International Studies Program. Td.
29 DONALD N. CLARK, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF KOREA 32 (Greenwood Press 2000).
30 Pamela A. Newman, The Confucian Ethic:A System of Ideas in Korea, at 225-27, available
at
http://www.koreasociety.org/component/option,com-docman/Itemid,35/taskdo- download/
gid, 191/; see also DENISE POTRZEBA LETT, IN PURSUIT OF STATUS: THE MAKING OF SOUTH KOREA'S
"NEW" URBAN MIDDLE CLASS 14 (Harvard University Press 1998).
31 See generally Robert V. Kemper, One Anthropologist, Two Worlds: Three Decades of
Reflexive Fieldwork in North American and Asia, 10 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 182 (2004)
(book review). Choong Soon Kim is professor of anthropology at the University of Tennessee at
Martin. 1d.
'32CHOONG SOON KIM, THE CULTURE OF KOREAN INDUSTRY: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF POONGSAN
CORPORATION 57-59 (Univ. of Arizona Press 1992) (demonstrating, through an empirical study of
Poongsan Corporation, that cultural traits of the Korean industrial success originate from
Confucianism).
33 Central Intelligence Agency's The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html. After the 1960s, Korea followed the Japanese model and developed
into one of the "Four Mini Dragons." Edward A. Olsen, Japan-South Korea Security Ties, AIR U.
REV., May-June 1981, at 60, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/
aureview/1981/may-jun/olsen.htm. Statistics compiled by the Central Intelligence Agency reveal
that '[f]our decades ago GDP per capita was comparable with levels in the poorer countries of Africa
and Asia." Central Intelligence Agency, supra. Today its GDP per capita is fourteen times the level
of North Korea, and is "roughly the same as that of Greece and Spain." Id.
31 Thomas G. Rawski, Chinese Industrial Reform.* Accomplishments, Prospects, and
Implications, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 271, 272 (1994) (mentioning that IPR enforcement is normally
weaker in emerging markets than in developed markets).
35Linsu, Kim, Technology Transfer and Intellectual PropertyRights; The Korean Experience,
in UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, at 1-2 (International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No. 2, 2003) available at
http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/CS-kim.pdf.
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intractable and unpredictable. 36 Despite the remarkable economic prosperity,
China's political dilemma in its democratization process has provided an institutional
account for its weak effectiveness of IPR enforcement. China's communist
development trajectory which resulted in a lack of effective institutions had hindered
compliance with modern IPR norms.
One notable element worth mentioning is the misunderstanding of Confucian
values reflected by the misattributed proposition "To Steal a Book is an Elegant
Offense" (Qie Shu Bu Suan Tou). This concept was not popularized until 1919 when
the popular fiction Kong Yij" was published. 37 The author, well-known novelist Lu
Xun, attempts to exemplify the obsolescence of a pathetic literature and criticize the
conservative cultural heritage as a hindrance of social development. 38 In Lu Xun's
portrayal, Kong Yiji was depicted as a descended scholar who was teased wherever
he went. 39 He earned a living from copying manuscripts for rich patrons and
sometimes stole books to trade for wine. 40 His act drew on his being caught and
beaten. 41 To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense was his argument when he was
taunted. 42 His tattered spirit is alien to Confucian values. However, he shares the
same Chinese surname with Confucius ("Kong'), and this did much to cause and
perpetuate confusion in the popular mind. Indeed, the phrase "To Steal a Book Is an
Elegant Offence" was unknown to Chinese until Kong Yiji as a fictional character
appeared in the early twentieth century and, interestingly, it was unpopular to
43
foreigners until Professor Alford's book made its debut in the mid 1990s.

I.

LORD YE'S FONDNESS OF DRAGONS: DILEMMA OF DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

In ancient China, a county magistrate in Chu Kingdom was called the Lord Ye
(Ye Gong) who was known widely as a great lover of dragons. 44 The Lord Ye was so
fond of dragons that the dragons were painted or carved on his walls, pillars, beams,
furniture, window lattices and ceilings. 45 The dragon in heaven was moved and
descended to earth to visit him.

46

At this sight, the Lord Ye fled in panic.

47

This

36 NIE, supra note 3, at 243-53 (describing various political and judicial obstacles to efficient
and effective enforcement of intellectual property rights in China).
37 LU XUN, Kong Yjlm in NA HAN [OUTCRY] (People's Literature Press 1973), translatedin LU
XUN, DIARY OF A MADMAN AND OTHER STORIES 42-48 (William A. Lyell trans., 1990).

Lu Xun

(1881-1936), pseudonym of Zhou Shuren, was a short-story writer, essayist, critic, and literary
theorist. JAMES REEVE PUSEY, LU XUN AND EVOLUTION (Univ. of Hawaii Press 1998); JON EUGENE
VON KOWALLIS, THE LYRICAL Lu XUN: A STUDY OF HIS CLASSICAL-STYLE VERSE (1996).

He is

arguably one of the greatest writers of modern China, and is considered a revolutionary pioneer by
Chinese Communists. Id.
38 See gonerallyXun, supra note 37, at 42-48.
'39Id.

at 43.
40 Id. at 43-44.
41 Id

42 Id. at 44.

43 Id. at 42-48.

44 See Xiao Min, Jingdian Chengyu Gushi 1: Yo Gong Hao Long [Classica]Chineso Idioms 1:
Lord Ye's Fondness of Dragons] 1-156 (Northeast Normal Univ. Press 2001).
45 See id.
46 See id.

47 See id.

[7:454 2008]

The Paradox of Confucian Determinism

story shows that Lord Ye was not genuinely fond of dragons but merely images of
48
dragons-he professed love of what he actually feared (re gong hao long).
Chinese central leaders are in such an ambivalent and self-contradictory
position in terms of China's political transition. 49 China is currently standing at an
ideological, social, and political crossroad: the intersection of a splendid economic
landscape marred by lagging political reform. 50 The assumption that the spread of
Beatles music and Mercedes Benz cars throughout China is representative of the
triumph of Western democracy is only a myth. 51 Chinese leaders maintain that the
democracy is not a panacea for China's problems. 52 Despite pious declarations of
good intentions about political reform, the process of democratization seems to have
53
stagnated.
On the other hand, however, there have been growing concerns that the ongoing
54
economic reform may have opened a Pandora's Box of unintended consequences.
This dilemma has made Chinese leaders solicitous in initiating substantial political
reform. 55 Although the principle of democracy has been introduced into the
Constitution, 56 China likes democracy in the way of Lord Ye: China accepts the fame
of democracy but does not embrace the spirit of it. While China has committed itself
to a socialist "rule of law" state, 57 without the spirit of liberal democracy, the "rule of
law" in China will unsurprisingly remain problematic. The enormous transformation
of the political, social and economic landscape has fundamentally reshaped the
beliefs and values of Chinese citizens. 58 Individual aspirations of the citizens are
widespread, but they are released without a corresponding regulation system.
Having been frustrated to bring its political evolution into comprehensive
correspondence with its economic growth, the Chinese government runs the risk of
precipitating the social instability by means of high pressure. 59 Against the backdrop
of economic transition, the Chinese government has found itself in a precarious

48

See id.

49 See gene-rally Wei-Wei Zhang, Chinas Political Transition:Trends and Prospects,EURASIA

Oct.-Nov. 2003 (discussing China's recent attempts to reform the economy without
reforming the political system and the problems caused by such an attempt).
50 Soo id. at 11 (discussing that Chinese economic reform may better be described as "great
economic reform with lesser political reform").
ol Id. at 12; see also Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred
Schools Contend:DebatingRule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 471, 536 (2002) (noting that
there are differences in fundamental values between Western democracies and Asian countries).
52 See INFO. OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., BUILDING OF POLITICAL
DEMOCRACY
IN CHINA, § 1 A CHOICE SUITED TO
CHINA'S CONDITIONS,
available at
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy(1).html
(last visited Apr. 5,
BULLETIN,

2008).

53 See Xianglin Xu, Yi Zhengzhi Wending Wei Jiehu de Zhongguo Jianjin Gaige [Chinas

Politica]Reform is PreoccupiedbyInstrumentalism],5

STRATEGY AND MANAGEMENT (2000).

54 See Zhang, supra note 49, at 12.
55 See id. at 13 ("Most reformers still believe that political reform should be a gradual,
pragmatic and experimental process.").

C
Id.
57 See XIAN FA art. 5, § 1 (2004) (P.R.C.) (stating that the People's Republic of China "practices
building a socialist rule of law system").
58 MARK BORTHWICK, PACIFIC CENTURY-THE
(1992).
,,9

Id.

EMERGENCE OF MODERN PACIFIC ASIA 403
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position and has to confront the grievous crises derived from the unbalanced
0
economic reform: regional disparities, rampant income gaps, rising unemployment,61
widespread official corruption and, arguably the most serious, a collapse of
traditional values. 62 In order to survive the upheaval, people have to contemplate
every possible approach they deem workable. Ironically, the money fetishism 63 that
Karl Marx criticized over a century ago may now have been adopted as the credo of
64
many people who are, or used to be, his faithful disciples.
Apart from the cascading societal and political problems that have reshaped the
moral standards of Chinese citizens, China's rigid control over the religion has also
contributed to the sprouting and growing of utilitarian impulse. As an entrenched
international human right, it is recognized in all the important international human
rights treaties and remains the focus of debate in a variety of international human
rights bodies. 65 However, Chinese government has demonstrated a continued
reluctance to be flexible in its religious policies and provide minimum guarantee for
religious freedom. 66 As a result, a large percentage of the population, particularly
the youth, lacks religious beliefs and the ethical support that those beliefs provide.
Although religion and law are usually viewed as two elements of moral values
with distinct social identities, in reality, religious faith and legal order inevitably
interact. 67 Of course while it is too arrogant to assert that morality would be
impossible without religious belief, it may be true that, under religious principles,
individuals are more inclined to adhere to an ethical code and bind themselves by
social, legal or moral tie. The imposition of law by its own force or momentum is
tenuous.
Without religious belief and faith, there would be no developed
multidimensional systems to provide a firm foundation to enable an enduring belief
in law and, as such, no self-disciplining consciousness to constrain counterfeiting and
piracy.
Another generic reason is the Chinese government's unwillingness to safeguard
the freedom of speech. While China has achieved impressive economic prosperity,
the central government has endeavored to maintain stringent control over the

60 See Income Gap in China Widens in First Quarter, CHINA DAILY, June 19, 2005,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/19/content 452636.htm (stating China's income
gap continued to extend in the first quarter of 2005, with ten percent of its richest people owning 45
percent of the country's wealth, while China's poorest ten percent had only 1.4 percent of the
nation's wealth).
(31See China Expects Hiher Urban Unemployment Rate in 2005, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE,
Mar. 7, 2005, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/06/eng20050306_175774.html
(stating 11 million urban residents were awaiting employment).
(32
ANNE F. THURSTON, MUDDLING TOWARD DEMOCRACY POLITICAL CHANGE IN GRASSROOTS
CHINA iii, xiii (1998), available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/thurst23/thurst23.html.
(3 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 81-96 (Frederick Engels ed.,
Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., The Modern Library 1936) (explaining how money
fetishism attributes powers to an alien force that dominates social affairs).
(34Id.
(35
LEONARD M. HAMMER,A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: DESCRIPTIVE
THOUGHTS FOR NORMATIVE ISSUES 73 (2007).
(36
THURSTON, supranote 62, at iii, xiii.
(37
HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 209-20
(1993).
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media. 68 Chinese mass media, which is criticized as the mouthpiece (houshe) of the
Party, has been squeezed into the mission of issuing propaganda. 69 A recent example
is the proposed national emergency law which has drawn a great deal of attention in
China since June 2006.70 This proposed law, which has the alleged objective of
enhancing disaster responsiveness and ensuring administrative responsibility, 71
includes a media clause that would impose heavy fines on news media reporting
without authorization on natural disasters, public health incidents or industrial
accidents. 7 2 As a consequence, "coin it in silence" (men shengfa da cai), which means
making fortunes quietly without being associated with politics, has been a motto for
many Chinese in their attempts of livelihood. In this circumstance, unless genuine
effort is being taken by the government, it would be naturally assumed that people
are well positioned to reap the benefits of piracy as a means of "making fortunes
quietly."

III. A SQUARE

PEG IN A ROUND HOLE: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS PROTECTION UNDER
COLLECTIVIST IDEOLOGY?

In contrast to Western notions of property rights, Communism, the
unprecedented socialist experiment calling for equality and freedom in the twentieth
century, 73 substantially influenced cultural perceptions in modern China. 74 As
Robert Weatherley has noted, Karl Marx deemed the individual as a "species being"
who exists as an intrinsic part of the society to which he or she was born.7 5 Upon the
establishment of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") in 1949, China abolished the
entire corpus of existing legal regime and began to introduce a new legal system
based on the Soviet template.7 6 As a consequence of the ideological predisposition,
the mentality of sharing wealth became dominant, and the IPR regime was deeply
embedded in the notion that "individual rights are most readily defended as effective
68 See

CONG.-EXECUTIVE

COMMISSION

ON

CHINA

ANN.

REP.

(2002),

available

at

http ://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/2002annRptEng.pdf.
G9 Id

70China Mulls Emergency Management Law, XINHUA NEWS NET, June 24, 2006, available at
http ://english.gov.cn/2006-06/24/content_318883.htm..
71 Id,

72See Shangwu Sun, EmergencyResponse Law 'Will Ensure Accurate Info,' CHINA DAILY, July
14, 2006, at 1. Article 57 stipulates that "news media violating certain rules to report the
development and handling of emergencies without authorization, or releasing fraudulent reports,
will be fined between 50,000 Yuan (USD $6,250) and 100,000 Yuan (USD $12,500), if the reports
lead to serious consequences." Id.
73 See A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT, 102-05 (Tom Bottomore et al. eds., Harvard
University Press 1983) (discussing the different notions of property rights of communist and
capitalist societies).
74See Brigitte Binkert, Why the Current Global Intellectual Property Framework Under
TRIPs is Not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL 143, 147 (2006).
75 ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: HISTORICAL AND

IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 93, 104 (Palgrave 1999) (examining the relationship between and
reconciliation of individual rights and the superiority of collective interests).
76 See Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of China s EmergingIntellectualPropertyRegime:

HitoricalUnderpinnings, The Current System and Prospects for the Future,6 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 372, 417 (1996).
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means to state ends." 77 Accordingly, China's IPR protection regime was built upon

the foundation that sustains "the balance between collectivist and individualist
thought,"78 and "the harmony of interests between individuals and the state they
belong to." 79 In order to maintain a harmonious community, citizens are usually
encouraged to consciously, and sometimes unconditionally, give up any rights in
favor of the society.80 Not surprisingly, collectivist ideology is apt to undermine IPR
81
as a form of individual right.
As a result, the transplanted IPR system is like "a square peg in a round hole,"
making it "more of a wish list for foreign investors than a realistic and effective
system" of global enforcement for IPR.8 2 Although the law has been introduced and
implemented, there is an inertial way of thinking among some of China's leaders to
view IPR as a barrier to obtain modern technologies necessary for continued
economic development.8 3 Indeed, it is still a dominant discourse in China that in
accepting reluctantly the incompatible standards for the protection of foreign IPR,
China, together with other developing countries, are being exploited and
dominated.84 Ironically, while the American critics depict China as a "land of
unethical pirates," some Chinese see the United States as a "land of money-grabbing
monopolists."85

Since the principle of intellectual property contravenes the fundamental beliefs
of a collectivist society, implementation of IPR is thus undertaken with reluctance.
Although the "door" has been opened for decades, and China has obtained
membership of the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), public ownership remains
dominant and China is still a Communist country in terms of constitutional
ideology.8 6 The negative aspects of the notions have not been rooted away entirely
77WEATHERLEY, supra note 75, at 128.
78 Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent versus Trade Secret
Protection Decision for the MultinationalCorporationin China, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 437,
446 (2004).
7)WEATHERLEY, supra note 75, at 95-96, 126-28 (explaining that, in Marxist thinking,
individuals are not expected to exercise their rights in a way that fulfils a perceived need to protect
themselves from the authority of the state, since the interests of individuals and the state are
basically identical).
80WEATHERLEY, supra note 75, at 105-06.
81 Bejesky, supra note 78, at 447.
82 See Scott J. Palmer, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the Politics of Intellectual
PropertyRights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 449, 450 (2001).
83 Andrew J. McCall, Copyrightand Trademark Enforcement in China, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW 587,
591 (1996).
81 Id. (mentioning that the developing nations view the importation of intellectual property as
a means of the developed nations to dominate and explore the developing world); see also, J. Cheng,
China's Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPs Requires an Internal Focus and WTO
Membership, 21 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 1941, 1982 (1998) (maintaining that "China shares economic
disincentives to the vigorous enforcement of intellectual property rights with many other developing
countries").
85 Chen, supra note 5, at 8.
6 XIAN FA art. 6 (1982) (P.R.C.). According to Article 6 of the Constitution, "the basis of the
socialist economic system of the People's Republic of China is socialist public ownership of the
means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by the
working people. Id. The system of socialist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation
of man by man; it applies the principle of'from each according to his ability, to each according to his
work'." Id. "During the primary stage of socialism, the State adheres to the basic economic system
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and still unconsciously influence comprehension and belief of intellectual property
law, at least for some of Chinese leaders.

IV. CLAIMS OF PRIVATE RIGHTS UNDER PUBLIC OWNERSHIP

The Private property rights are among the fundamental concepts upon which
many Western states are built and IPR was born of a predominantly Western concept
of private property rights and benefits.8 7 However, influenced by communist ideology
and collectivist mentality, Chinese society has traditionally viewed private rights as
individualization, which is considered immoral.88 Unlike the constitutions in most
developed countries which hold sacred the private rights, the Constitution of China
does not explicitly address IPR.8 9 It does, in contrast, place a strong emphasis on the
public interest in terms of rights and responsibilities. 90 In addition, Chinese justice
is "geared towards the settlement of specific disputes rather than defining the claims
for private rights." 91 Although Marxist fundamentalism has been loosened by the
new "pragmatic" Chinese leadership, the legacy of communitarian thought has a
certain amount of inertia. As Weatherley explains, one possibly significant point to
be drawn from the Chinese practice of defining rights is the unequivocal rejection of
the concept that rights are universal.9 2 In a similar vein, a notable characteristic of
China's legal landscape is "the government's establishment of the interrelated
93
doctrines of legal equality and political inequality in the context of civil obligations."
The comprehension of general private rights is nascent and, as such, the legislation
for protecting them is in some senses rudimentary. The lack of rights consciousness
illustrates, at least to some extent, how Western legal concepts are incompatible and
94
incommensurable with Chinese traditions and aspirations.

V. OSSIFIED BUREAUCRACY AND DECENTRALIZED RESPONSIBILITIES

Effective enforcement calls for optimal allocation of responsibilities and
resources among different authorities to ensure transparency and accountability at
various levels. Unfortunately, China's vertical administrative structure provides
with the public ownership remaining dominant and diverse sectors of the economy developing side
by side, and to the distribution system with the distribution according to work remaining dominant
and the coexistence of a variety of modes of distribution." Id.
87 Eric M. Griffin, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!-A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection
in the People's Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 182 (1998).
88 WEATHERLEY, supra note 75, at 93.
89 Derk Bodde & Clarence Morris, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 18-21 (Harvard University Press
1967).
90 See XIAN FA arts. 10, § 3, 13 (1982) (P.R.C.). China's existing Constitution emphasizes the
'public interest" in terms of expropriation and requisition of land and private properties. Id.
91Jill Chiang Fung, Can Mickey Mouse Prevailin the Court of the Monkey Kling? Enforcing
Foreign Intellectual PropertyRights in the People's Republic of China, 18 L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
613, 615 (1996).
92 WEATHERLEY, supra note 75, at 107.
93 Palmer, supra note 82, at 454.
94 Id, at 475-76.

[7:454 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

significant scope for overlapping jurisdictions between enforcement institutions,
which exhibit a substantial degree of heterogeneity across regions and result in
parallel enforcement mechanisms. 95 A notable challenge in practice falls in the
determination as to who asserts jurisdiction over the enforcement, which, in many
circumstances, results in continuous bureaucratic turf battles among various
national ministries and between central and local government agencies.96 For
instance, the Ministry of Commerce ("MOFCOM")-Chinese chief negotiator
equivalent to the United States Trade Representative ("USTR")-acts merely as a
coordinator over enforcement agencies and has no direct authorities over domestic
enforcement as the USTR does. The result is ineffective enforcement that is the
further complicated by a lack of financial resources and the emergence of
9
decentralized administrative bureaucracies. '
Having accomplished its mission of promoting a positive result of the WTO
negotiations through the domestic bureaucracy, MOFCOM has "exhausted its
political capital" and has little goodwill on which it can draw to ensure effective
implementation of the result. 98 Accordingly, it has entered into a new stage of
implementing these agreements, and thus it is the turn for other ministries such as
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce ("SAIC") to translate the
agreements into action. 99 However, due to the lack of expertise and because of the
departmental protectionism, the later is liable to impede appropriate initiatives and
therefore slow down working efficiencies. 100
Thus the Trademark Office still remains under the control of SAIC, rather than
being brought within the responsibility of the State Intellectual Property Office,101
which oversees only the patent matters.10 2 The Trademark Review and Adjudication
Board ("TRAB"), 103 which should be independent from the Trademark Office, is
nevertheless under the control of SAIC.104 For example, "prior right" or malicious
95 Daniel C.K. Chow, Enforcement Against Counterfeitingin the People's Republic of China, 20
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 447, 454-55 (2000).
96 Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeitingin the People'sRepublic of China, 78 Wash. U. L. Q. 1, 32

(2000).

( 7 Jessica C. Wong, The Challenges MultinationalCorporationsFace in ProtectingTheir Well-

Known Trademarksin China, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937, 965 (2006).
98 Mark L. Clifford, Chinas FadingFree-TradeFervor,BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, June 5, 2002,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2002/nf2002065_48 30.htm.
9 Jay Sha, Making the Most of Administrative Actions, MANAGING INTELL. PROP.,
Supplement-China
IP
Focus
2006,
available
at
http://www.managingip.com/
Article.aspx?ArticlelD=1321355.
100 Clifford, supra note 98.
101 See generally SIPO ENGLISH, http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipoEnglish/about/basicfacts/
overview/200707/t20070723_182116.htm. The Chinese Patent Office was established in 1980 and
renamed
as the State Intellectual Property Office in 1998. Id.
02
1 JAY SHA, SUMMARY OF CHANGES OF CHINESE TRADEMARK LAW (Jeekai & Partners 2001).

103 See Zhang Qiao, Introduction of TrademarkReview and Adjudication Board SAIC, China,
in ITALIAN MINISTRY OF PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES, GENERAL DIRECTION FOR DEVELOPMENT,
PRODUCTION AND COMPETITIVENESS
(2005),
available at http://www.ice.gov.it/convegno/

CD%20Cina/pdf/013%o2OZhang%/2OQiao.pdf.
The TRAB, an administrative organ established by
SAIC, is responsible for the review and adjudication of trademarks with respect to the
determination of the attribution of the trademark, exercising the right of final adjudication on
matters of trademark review and adjudication. Id. at 108. A decision of TRAB is, however, subject
to judicial review. Id. at 109.
104 Id. at 105.
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anticipatory registration of marks of fame is stipulated in the Trademark Law
(2001)10 5 in an effort to prohibit the registration of any mark copying or imitating
other prior lawful rights. 10 6 These "prior rights" are recognized and accepted by some
authorities but not by all. The registration of business names, for instance, is
managed at different administrative levels and, at a local level, limited to a certain
geographical area.10 7 The business name registration remains separate and the
resistance to recognition of such "prior rights" still exists among local AICs which are
10 8
in charge of the registration.
Similar problems can be seen with regard to copyright. The National Copyright
Administration ("NCA") of China, the State Council's copyright administrative
control department, is responsible for, inter alia, the implementation of national
copyright laws and international treaties, investigation of infringement cases,
administration of external copyright relations and guidance for local authorities. 10 9
However, the NCA shares a "two in one" administrative system with the General
Administration of News and Publication.110 The operation of this dual structure has
inevitably led to insufficient resources and expertise of copyright and its arbitrary
and incoherent performance. Moreover, some enforcement bodies, such as SAIC and
the NCA, have seen cutbacks in staff and resources over the past years in light of the
streamlining and restructuring efforts.111 For example, as of early 2005, China's
Trademark Office, which had a backlog of 20,000 cases of trademark dispute, was

still dealing with complaints filed in

1999.112

VI. SEEKING TRANSPARENCY IN "CAMERA OBSCURA"
Transparency as a WTO principle had been anticipated to be leverage to
promote predictability and significantly alter the image of China's legal system upon
its WTO accession. While China has been implementing systematic reform towards
its legal system, this expectation appeared to be over-optimistic. Indeed, despite the
necessity of building rule of law-based administration and judiciary, the
transparency in both administrative and judicial institutions in China remains
105 Trademark Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Fifth Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 23,
1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983), art. 9, translated in INTELL. PROP. LAWS & REGS 31 (P.R.C)
[hereinafter Trademark Law (P.R.C)].
106 See Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority Rights: An
InternationalPerspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 771 (2006) (discussing recent changes in Chinese trademark law attempting
to provide protection for unregistered but well-known foreign marks).
107 Alisa Cahan, Note, China 5 Protection of Famous and Well-Known Marks: The Impact of

China's Latest Trademark Law Reform on Infringement and Remedios, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L &

COMP. L. 219, 237-38 (2004).
108 Id.

109 Andy Y. Sun, Beijing Court DismissedMicrosoft for Lack of Evidence: Major Software End
User Infringement Case in China May Return Later 1 ASIAN PAC. L. INST. 2 (2000), available at
http://apli.org/ftp/APLIUpdate2.pdf (explaining that under Article 8 of the Copyright Law, the NCA
is the proper agency for copyright issues).
110 Wong, supra note 97, at 964.
111 Chris Buckley, Pushed on Patents, China Shoves Back, INT'L HERALD TRIB., January 14,
2005, at 13, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/01/13/business/yuan.php.
112 Id.

[7:454 2008]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

elusive. For example, the government's legal gazette often fails to provide updated
notice of changes in administrative rules and regulations and the public has no
steady and direct access to the legal databases. 113 Moreover, the particular nature of
China's legal system is largely reflected in what is categorized as internal (neibu)
provisions and interpretations, which are normally unavailable to the public and
11 4
which may be in contradiction with published laws and regulations.
The lack of transparency, to a large extent, can be attributed to the Chinese
11 5
preference for organizing systems by human relationship rather than regulation.
Political compromise and consensus are usually reached in "smoke-filled rooms"
rather than in a public arena. In a system driven by personal favors characterized by
"attaining objectives in camera obscura" (anxiang eaozuo), transparency becomes
symbolic. As a consequence, the enforcement of IPR by relevant agencies has become
a major structural problem within the bureaucracy, a system with a high degree of
discretion based largely on "back door" political manipulation,1 16 which provides a
raw portrayal of the Chinese bureaucracy. The intention of circumventing the
excessive bureaucratic red tape leads to reluctance in addressing the IPR
infringements, and many IPR proprietors have to seek assistance without recourse to
117
legal system.

VII. STRUGGLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ADHERING TO THE "CORRECT
POLITICAL ORIENTATION"

In China, it is part of tradition that infringers can "openly flaunt the law by
relying on protection from friends [and relatives] in government." 118 Personal
networks with influential individuals are usually more important than legal
provisions in seeking appropriate remedies.11 9 Indeed, as the Chinese proverb goes,
"having friends in government is key to quenching everything intractable (chao
zhongyou ren hao banshi)." Although anecdotal, social network (guanx) does play a
significant role in shaping a typical Chinese society. When encountered difficult
problems, people tend to seek solution through personal relationship rather than
legal support, particularly pursuing network as the avenue of first recourse. 120 The
use of such network to influence judicial decision is common in China through which

113 Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China's WTO Accession, Film Piracy,and Prospects
for Enforcement of CopyrikhtLaws, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 63, 101 (2002).
MH Reiko R. Feaver, China's Copyright Law and the TRIPs Agreement, 5 FLA. ST. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 431, 455 (1996).
115 Patrick Hu,The China 301 on Market Access: A Prelude to GATTMembership. 3 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 131, 144 (1994).
116See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 NW.J.
INT'L L. & BuS. 383, 390-91 (2000) (discussing the broad discretion granted to Chinese
administrative agencies and their potential for arbitrariness).
117 Susan Tiefenbrun, The Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former Soviet
Union and Its Effects upon InternationalTrade:A Comparison,46 BUFF.L. REV. 11, 17 (1998).
118 Willard, supra note 76, at 430.
119 See Bejesky, supra note 78, at 474 (mentioning that "[p]ersonal connections with key

individuals in emerging market countries are often more important than the written law").
120Id.
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certain cases are specifically categorized as "guanxi cases," which are expected to
121
receive differential treatment.
Moreover, the judicial system in China is still dependent upon local
administration in finance and personnel. 122 Under "unified leadership of the Party,"
a judge in China is de facto a governmental official, and it is apparent that most of
the judges are more than complacent about the political status quo. 123 As a
consequence, courts are still expected to follow instructions articulated by the Party
Committee and the government. 124 Indeed, there is a slogan which has been given
wide publicity within the Chinese judicial system: "keeping firmly to the correct
political orientation of the judiciary (ianehi shenpan gongzuo de zhengzhi
fangxiang)." 125 Succumbing to pressures from the local government, judges may
appear partial to local parties and government.

126

CONCLUSION

The IPR enforcement problem has its cultural element but cannot be
attributable to the Confucian values as the mainstream view presents. The reality of
China has, at least to some extent, proves the contrary-the rampant IPR
enforcement problem is not due to the existence, but rather, due to the decline of the
Confucian values. The IPR enforcement problem is not an actual outcome of
Confucian philosophy and "to steal a book" is not an "elegant offence."
China has committed itself to a socialist "rule of law" state, without the spirit of
a liberal democracy. As a consequence, economic reform has not only brought about
greater prosperity, but also created grievous crises. In addition, the restriction of
religious belief and the tough control over freedom of speech have contributed to the
growing of utilitarian impulse. In this context, there is no exaggeration that the
counterfeiting and piracy are a natural consequence of a unique set of socioeconomic
conditions that have their origin in the development of a dysfunctional institutional
regime.
To a large extent, the IPR enforcement problems are attributed to its unique
bureaucracy characterized by the collectivist ideology, decentralized responsibilities,
the lack of transparencies and the inadequate judiciary. The reasons for the IPR
enforcement problem in China are manifold and are interdependent. However, the
political aspect, inter alia, plays a decisive role. With enigmatic political dilemmas
that rival its economic prosperity, the ultimate outcome of IPR enforcement largely
121 Lubman,

supranote 116, at 396.
supra note 82, at 452; see also J. Cheng, supra note 84, at 1992 (discussing the
problems of Chinese judicial system due to its "inability to render impartial judgments").
122 Palmer,
123 Id.
124

Id.

See, e.g., Xiao Yang, Kexue Fazhan Fayuan Shiye, Tuos-han Chuli Shi Ge Guanxi
(Improving Judiciary Through Coping with Ten EssentialRelationships),XINHUA NEWS NET, Jan.
5, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-01/05/content4014729.htm.
Xiao
125

Yang, the President of Supreme People's Court, gave emphasis during an interview that the Court
must respect the leadership of the Party conscientiously and keep firmly to the correct political
orientation. See id.
126 J. Cheng, supra note 84, at 1992-93.
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468

depends on the political will of the Chinese leaders and the level of their attainment
in combating political fragmentation. China's formula for success stems, to a great
extent, from the highly authoritarian system and its absorbed promotion of coherent
institutional reform and rule of law. To carry out such a reform in China's
conservative and bureaucratic colossus must be an enormous challenge and the
process can be lengthy. However, this is a learning curve for which there is no
panacea.

